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In the discussions of the need for fiscal rules and their usefulness in a monetary 
union researchers have not agreed on whether the financial markets have a 
sufficiently disciplining effect on the governments, which would mean that the 
fiscal rules are not necessary. This paper investigates whether the European Union’s 
main fiscal rule, the Stability and Growth Pact, could be substituted by the financial 
markets, taking into account also the effects of the latest financial and economic 
crisis. Our findings suggest that there is certain interaction between the financial 
markets and the governments’ decisions on the fiscal policies and that this reaction 
has become stronger after the beginning of the crisis. However, the institutional 
setup and market conditions in the European Union are such that this interaction is 
biased and thus we conclude that the Union needs to have fiscal rules. 
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The European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is a very unique project, both from the 
political and economic point of view. Its functioning was based on the Maastricht Treaty 
where, inter alia, the well-known limits on government deficit and debt ratios to GDP were 
set (3% and 60%, respectively).
1 It, however, seems that the member states did not consider 
the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty sufficient to ensure fiscal discipline after the accession 
of the member states to the EMU, as they later concluded the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP).  
The establishment of the EMU necessitated a lot of changes, such as a new currency, new 
institutions (especially the European Central Bank
2) and the already mentioned new set of 
fiscal rules that should ensure a good working of the monetary union, the SGP. Ever since its 
adoption the SGP has been quite controversial. One reason for criticisms of the Pact is the fact 
that certain economists questioned the need for fiscal rules in the EMU at all. In their work 
researchers have identified several reasons for the application or non-application of fiscal 
rules in a monetary union.  
First, there is the issue of the credibility of the central bank and its commitment to price 
stability. Researchers dealing with this, such as Eijffinger & de Haan (2000), Beetsma et al. 
(2001), Buiter (2006), Lindbeck & Niepelt (2006), Ardy et al. (2006) or Fitoussi & Saraceno 
(2007), mostly share the opinion that the absence of fiscal rules and thus the existence of 
expansive fiscal policies could hamper the credibility of the monetary authority and weaken 
its commitment to keeping the price level stable. 
Second, there is the tendency of governments to run budget deficits. Researchers generally 
agree that this is a legitimate reason for the existence of fiscal rules (see e.g. Eijffinger & de 
Haan (2000), Kopits (2001), Stark (2001), Schneider & Hedbavny (2003), Wyplosz (2006), 
Catenaro & Morris (2008)).  
Third, the impact of unsound fiscal policies on union-wide interest rates is often discussed. 
Most of the researchers treating this issue are of the opinion that this effect may be dangerous 
(see e.g. Feldstein (2005), Ardy et al. (2006), Lindbeck & Niepelt (2006), Catenaro & Morris 
(2008)). However, certain authors disagree, such as Wyplosz (2006) or Fitoussi & Saraceno 
(2007).  
                                                            
1 One of the clauses of the Maastricht Treaty that is very important for our analysis is Article 104b of the TEU 
(in original version) that provides for a non-bailout clause: neither the Community, nor any of its members 
should be liable for the commitments of a member state’s government or other public authorities.  
2 Its main task was set to ensure the stability of the new currency through a stable price level. Furthermore it was 
decided that the ECB ought to be independent of the national and Community political authorities and is 
prohibited from providing any type of credit to the member states’ governments or Community institutions.  3 
 
Many arguments why fiscal rules should not be used in a monetary union also exist. These are 
mentioned e.g. by Beetsma et al. (2001), Kopits (2001) and Woods (2008). They cover effects 
of fiscal rules like the governments’ limited scope for reaction to shocks or their resort to 
creative accounting.  
Another one is the claim that fiscal rules are actually not needed because they can be 
substituted by the disciplining effect of the financial markets. Fitoussi & Saraceno (2007) 
recall two papers (by Alesina et al. (1992) and Bernoth (2004)) which conclude that markets 
are able to monitor fiscal performance and put pressure on governments through the spreads 
between different bonds and that they have not lost this ability after the introduction of the 
EMU.  
Eijffinger & de Haan (2000) claim that markets may not be disciplining enough. They explain 
that the markets might not differentiate between a fiscally disciplined and undisciplined 
country within a monetary union by demanding different yields on their government bonds 
because they may expect that even if, in the case of the EMU, the Maastricht Treaty provided 
for a no-bail-out clause, the Union would help a member state in troubles for political reasons. 
This view is supported by Hedbavny et al. (2004) who, when comparing the EU with the US, 
claim that the markets have a higher probability of expecting a bail-out in the EU because this 
union has fewer member states than the US and thus all countries have a greater influence on 
all important decisions. This view is, however, opposed by Schucknecht et al. (2008) who 
claim that based on their findings the no-bailout clause in the Maastricht Treaty seems to be 
credible.  
Furthermore, according to Eijffinger & de Haan (2000), markets tend to react slowly to an 
unsustainable fiscal position and then, when they finally (and often very strongly) react, such 
event can have contagion consequences. This was in fact confirmed in 2010 when we saw a 
sudden significant increase in spreads of Greece and then also of certain other countries 
(especially Ireland and Portugal).  
Woods (2008) agrees that until 2008 the markets have not been differentiating significantly 
among different euro government bonds. He reminds that we can expect that the markets may 
not reflect the individual countries’ situation properly, but also that their reactions might be 
‘abrupt and potentially very disruptive’.
 This is very well in line with the conclusions of 
Eijffinger & de Haan (2000) and also with the findings of Schucknecht et al. (2010) according 
to whom markets reacted 3-4 times more strongly to deficit differentials and 7-8  times more 
strongly to debt differentials after the beginning of the financial crisis.   
Kopits (2001) argues that well designed fiscal rules could have the same effect as the markets 
on the governments’ fiscal behaviour, but in a quicker and more efficient way and without 
their reactions’ adverse consequences such as high risk premiums or abrupt outflows of 
capital.  
We investigate the question of the substitutability of the SGP by the financial markets by 
analysing three different issues: first, the financial markets’ reaction to changing fiscal 4 
 
behaviour of the states; second, the governments’ response in terms of fiscal behaviour to the 
markets increasing their costs of borrowing; and, third, the question whether the market 
conditions and institutional setting in the EMU do not hamper these reactions or do not make 
them biased and inefficient. Therefore we test whether the government bond yield spreads 
change in reaction to increasing budget deficits and public debts, assuming that when a state’s 
fiscal stance starts to deteriorate, financial markets begin to ask a higher risk premium and 
thus the country’s government bond yields (and therefore also the spread relative to a 
benchmark) increase. Then we test whether the governments improve the structural primary 
balance when the spreads of their bonds increase, assuming that when the yields on 
government bonds increase, the costs of borrowing for a given country also grow and such 
country’s government reacts to this by increasing its structural primary balance, trying to 
reverse the trend. To do this we use data until the end of year 2009 to see what the impact of 
the recent crisis was.  
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we provide an overview of the related 
literature and also discuss the institutional conditions in the EMU that may significantly 
influence our conclusions. In Section 3 we present the data used for the investigation of the 
financial markets’ and the governments’ behaviour, performing also tests of statistical 
properties of the data. We then outline the method used for the estimation. In Section 4 we 
show our estimation results and in Section 5 we conclude.  
2  Related literature 
To tackle the question whether the Stability and Growth Pact could be substituted by the 
financial markets requires investigating three issues: first, whether the institutional setup and 
market conditions in the EMU enable an efficient working of the financial markets and a 
responsible behaviour of the governments; second, whether the financial markets react to a 
worsening fiscal stance of a government; and third, whether governments change their fiscal 
behaviour appropriately to the market signals. While many researchers have studied what 
drives yields (or spreads) of government bonds, only a few have explored the reaction of the 
governments to the market signals.  
2.1 Institutional setup and market conditions 
At the beginning of their paper, Balassone et al. (2004) remind that there are many 
prerequisites for the financial markets to be effective in disciplining the fiscal behaviour of 
the governments. They mention eight important, partly overlapping conditions that were 
outlined by Bishop et al. (1989) and Lane (1993). These can be summarized as follows: first, 
there is free movement of capital. Second, governments do not have privileged access to the 
market. Third, markets have access to all necessary information on sovereign borrowers. 
Fourth, bail-out is not allowed, there is no external guarantee and debts cannot be monetized. 
Fifth, the financial system can absorb the bankruptcy of a sovereign borrower. Finally, 
borrowing governments do respond to market signals.  5 
 
Balassone et al. (2004) argue that many of these conditions have already been fulfilled in the 
EMU, but several remain problematic. This can be confirmed today: first, information 
necessary for evaluating the financial reliability of governments is available to the markets 
with delay (e.g. in 2010 Eurostat released a lot of important statistics from the first quarter of 
the year with a four months lag, i.e. in July). Furthermore, we have to remind that the data are 
not 100% reliable - for example in the case of Greece they have become doubtful when this 
country’s creativity in producing statistics was discovered and these had to be reviewed 
several years backwards.  
Second, it is unsure whether the markets would be able to absorb the bankruptcy of a 
sovereign borrower. Blundell-Wignall & Slovnik (2010) showed that nearly 60% of the 
foreign-owned part of the Greek public debt was held by German and French banks and in 
case Greece defaulted on its obligations, the banking systems of these two countries may be 
significantly weakened because the Greek debt represented 12% and 6% of the banks’ Tier 1 
capital, respectively.  
Third, the borrowers’ response to market signals is uncertain but this is something that we can 
test for. Finally, the greatest problem seems to be the issue of (non-)bail-out and non-
existence of external guarantee. Bail-out is prohibited in the EMU
3 but the credibility of this 
ban has become more doubtful than ever, given the situation in Greece and Ireland and the 
loans that have been granted to them by other EU countries and the IMF, which is seen by 
many to be very close to a bail-out. This example would support the claim of Eijffinger & de 
Haan (2000) that fiscal rules in a monetary union are necessary.
4  
We have to bear all this in mind when drawing conclusions from our estimation results.  
2.2 The markets’ reaction 
Researchers generally agree that government bond yield spreads are determined by several 
factors: default risk, exchange rate risk and liquidity premiums, and factors such as 
transaction costs and differences in tax treatment or different sensitivities to common shocks. 
To this Lemmen & Goodhart (1999) note that in a monetary union the default risk is higher as 
the countries cannot inflate their debts or devalue their currencies. However, as we could see 
after the inception of the EMU, higher probability of bail-out in a monetary union may go in 
the opposite direction as far as the default risk is concerned.  
There are two main lines of research in the current literature that are connected with the issue 
of the reaction of the financial markets to the fiscal stance of governments. While the first one 
                                                            
3 It was already banned by the Maastricht Treaty.  
4 However, recently we have seen discussions about the possible introduction of the ‘bail-in’ of creditors which 
may be able to prevent investors from considering placing their money into the banks as risk free (expecting that 
governments will always bail the banks out). This would be done e.g. in the way that when a bank gets into 
financial problems its debt held by third parties would automatically be converted into common equity. See 
European Commission (2010).  6 
 
investigates the effect of fiscal variables on the government bond yields, the second one tries 
to assess their effect on government bond yield spreads.  
The first line of research is much less widespread than the second one. For this analysis the 
most relevant paper is that by Ardagna et al. (2004).
5 These authors worked with a panel of 16 
OECD countries and a time period of more than 40 years, using annual data. They did the 
estimation for two different periods, one using OLS estimation with country specific fixed 
effects and one using the GLS estimator.  The effect of both the primary deficit as share on 
GDP and the gross public debt as share on GDP on the 10-year government bond yields was 
significant in most specifications and was estimated to be around 0.1 and 0.01, respectively. 
However, as Gale & Orszag (2002) note, the overall level of long-term bond yields is affected 
by many factors and not only the fiscal policy. It may therefore be better to investigate the 
bond yield spreads relative to another country if we want to trace the effect of fiscal policy on 
the markets’ pricing of the costs of borrowing. This was confirmed by the recent development 
of the government bond yields that is illustrated in Figure A1 in the Appendix. We can see 
that after an increase in the bond yields of all governments between 2005 and 2007, many 
government bonds yields started to decrease in 2008, but the spreads among them have 
increased and this is what we are interested in.    
The literature aiming to explain the government bond yield spreads is very wide and usually 
Germany is used as the benchmark. It is generally accepted that the spreads in a monetary 
union are caused by differences in credit and liquidity risk premiums. Many researchers have 
also found that government bond spreads are driven by a common factor, usually referred to 
as international risk aversion. Manganelli & Wolswijk (2009) tried to find what drives this 
international risk aversion and they claimed that it was related to the level of short-term 
interest rates.
6 
Codogno et al. (2003) worked with monthly data for 10 EMU countries between 1995 and 
2002. Because of the period chosen, the authors took into account the exchange rate risk 
components of the government bond yield spreads in the regression. They also included in 
their model two variables that should approximate risk premiums. These were both related to 
the US economy (spreads between interest rates on US swaps and the federal government 
bond yields and between the yields on AAA US corporate bonds and the federal government 
bond yields). The authors came to the conclusion that government bond spreads in the 
Eurozone are mainly driven by credit risk and international factors and not so much by 
liquidity factors.  
Bernoth et al. (2006) used yield-at-issue data on spreads for 14 EU countries and the US 
federal government in the period from 1993 to 2005, taking into account only DM, then EUR 
issues and USD issues to avoid the influence of exchange rate risk on the yields. They used 
                                                            
5 Other papers are e.g. Laubach (2003), Pesani and Strauch (2003), Tavares and Valkanov (2001).  
6 For a detailed description of how the interest rates affect the government bond spreads see Manganelli & 
Wolswijk (2009). 7 
 
the 2SLS estimation technique adding both country- and time-specific fixed effects. The 
authors also included investors’ risk aversion into the regression. They proxied for it using the 
spread between BBB US corporate bond yields and the US government bond yields.  The 
authors concluded that yield spreads do respond to government indebtedness but that after the 
start of the EMU the markets’ attention moved from government debts and deficits to debt 
service-to-GDP ratios.  
Paesani et al. (2006) investigated the period between 1983 and 2003 for the USA, Germany 
and Italy, estimating a VAR model. They came to the conclusion that fiscal developments 
have influenced significantly the long-term interest rates.  
Schuknecht et al. (2008) investigated the government bond risk premiums for the EMU and 
Canada using data on bond yield spreads at issue from 1999 to 2005. Then, in Schuknecht et 
al. (2010), they reviewed their previous findings for the EMU, extending the period until May 
2009 and thus taking into account also the impact of the financial crisis. In both papers they 
estimated an OLS model with time fixed effects, including into the regression also two 
proxies for international risk aversion: the BBB US corporate bond yield spreads and also the 
short-term interest rates (3-month EURIBOR concretely). Their conclusion in 2008 was that 
yield spreads over an appropriate benchmark do respond to indicators of fiscal performance. 
In 2010 they added to this that the markets’ reaction to fiscal imbalances has become stronger 
after the fall of the Lehman Brothers. However, they did not account for the effect of the crisis 
itself (their crisis dummy was only included in the regression in interaction with other 
variables), which would very likely have an impact on their results.  
Alexopoulou et al. (2009) used monthly data for 8 new EU member states from 2001 to 2009 
and did the estimation using the pooled mean group technique.
7 They also took into account 
the global financial conditions and proxied for them using the stock market volatility of the 
Dow Jones Eurostoxx 50 index. These authors’ conclusion was that for most of the countries 
government bond yield spreads responded significantly to fiscal fundamentals.  
Haugh et al. (2009) estimated a simple panel model for 10 EMU countries over the period 
from December 2005 to June 2009, using quarterly data. These authors also included in their 
regression a proxy for risk in the form of spreads between high yield corporate bonds and 
government bonds. They concluded that differing fiscal policies have an important impact on 
government bond yield spreads. They, however, noted that this was not so evident in the pre-
crisis times when the general risk aversion was very low.  
2.3 The governments’ reaction 
Literature dealing with our second research question is rather limited. The only paper that we 
were able to find is the already mentioned work by Balassone et al. (2004). These authors test 
for different time periods (1981 – 2003, 1981 – 1991, 1992 – 1998 and 1999 – 2003) using 
the Arellano-Bond estimation technique how the governments change their structural primary 
                                                            
7 Quarterly or annual observations were linearly interpolated.  8 
 
budget balance in response to a change in the market price of public borrowing and come to 
the conclusion that the governments tend to react with a delay to changing market conditions 
and that the spreads have a different impact on the fiscal behaviour of the state depending on 




To investigate the issue of the financial markets’ reaction we used quarterly data from 1999 
until the end of 2009
8 for 16 EMU countries.  
While many researchers work with data on bond yields at issue, we used data on (long-term) 
government bond yields provided by the IMF (International Financial Statistics), as the 
former were not available to us.
9 The rest of our data comes from the Eurostat except for data 
on US spreads that are also taken from the IMF.  
We decided that the beginning of the period investigated would be year 1999 when the euro 
was introduced. It was shown e.g. by Blanco (2001) that the influence of the exchange rate 
risk on the yield spreads in the pre-EMU era was very significant. This is illustrated by Figure 
1 where we can see that after the elimination of national currencies the long-term government.  
 
Figure 1 – Long-term government bond yield spreads of chosen EMU countries 
            in 1985 – 2009 (in %)  
 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.  
                                                            
8 Working also with data for the first quarter of 2010 would have been very interesting but they were not 
available when the empirical part of this paper was written. 
9 Note that in the International Financial Statistics database the IMF does not do a precise distinction between 
different maturities of government bonds. It explains that ‘Government Bond Yield refers to one or more series 

























bond yield spreads, i.e. the difference between the long-term government bond yields of a 
given country and of Germany, decreased to very low numbers. The exchange rate risk is 
therefore something that has to be taken into account. Some researchers, such as Codogno et 
al. (2003), have treated the exchange rate risk component of the yield spreads using data on 
swap contracts denominated in different currencies, but we do not have access to such data. 
As our estimation begins in 1999, we do not need to proxy for the exchange rate risk 
Several countries from our sample, namely Greece, Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia and Slovakia, did 
not join the EMU already in 1999. These countries were only comprised in the estimation 
from their entrance into the EMU onwards.  
Looking at Figure 2, we can see that while until 2007 EMU long-term government bond yield 
spreads were very low, in 2008 they started to rise quite significantly. In the Appendix we 
included the spread figures for each country separately (Figure A2).  
 
Figure 2 – Long-term government bond yield spreads of EMU countries in 1999 - 2009 (in %)  
 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.  
As we have already mentioned, researchers generally agree that spreads are mainly influenced 
by the default risk, exchange rate risk and liquidity premiums, and factors such as transaction 
costs and differences in tax treatment or different sensitivities to common shocks. We assume 
that transaction costs and tax treatment are similar in the EMU and that exchange rate risk is 
not relevant any more. We therefore proxy for the default risk by using different fiscal 
indicators and we proxy for liquidity premiums and different sensitivities to shocks using 
other variables. Our regression is the following: 
 10 
 
Our dependent variable, Spread, is the difference between a country’s long-term government 
bond yield and the German long-term government bond yield, both expressed in percentage 
points. 
All our indicators of fiscal performance refer to the general government. The key fiscal 
indicators that we use in our estimation are the following: budget balance (or net lending) as 
share on GDP, expressed in percentage points, relative to Germany
10 (NetLending) that is 
expected to have a negative effect on the dependent variable, gross public debt as share on 
GDP relative to Germany (GrossDebt) that is expressed in percentage points and is expected 
to have a positive effect on the dependent variable, and the share of interest payable on 
governmental revenues (Int/Rev) that is expressed in percent and is also expected to have a 
positive effect on the dependent variable.  
To take into account the external position of the given countries, we also include in our 
estimation the current account as share on GDP (CA), expressed in percent.  
Based on Bernoth et al. (2006) we use as proxy for liquidity of a government’s debt the share 
of this debt on the sum of debts of all EMU countries (DebtShare), expressed in percent.
11 To 
proxy for international risk aversion we use two variables: the short-run interest rates in the 
EMU - 3-month EURIBOR (SR_IntRate) and the spread between the US bank prime loan rate 
and the US 10-year government bond yield (US_spread), as defined by the IMF.
12 We also 
controlled for changes in GDP using the variable GDPgrowth, expressed in percent.  
We use several time dummy variables. crisis has the value of 0 until the second quarter of 
2008 and 1 from the fall of the Lehman Brothers on, i.e. from the third quarter of 2008 until 
the end of 2009, which is also the end of our dataset. To be also able to distinguish the period 
of the crisis from the preceding period of turmoil when we could already observe some signs 
of the upcoming crisis, we use the variable turmoil which has the value of 1 from the third 
quarter of 2007 to the second quarter of 2008 and 0 otherwise. To make sure that it is correct 
to suppose that it is important to differentiate between the period of turmoil and the crisis 
period, we also try to do our estimation with variable turmcris which does not take the 
difference into account, having the value of 1 from the third quarter of 2007 on and 0 
otherwise. 
                                                            
10 I.e. the variables are expressed as difference from the German figures. This is because in our dependent 
variable we also compare the countries’ yields to those of Germany that has historically been considered as a 
benchmark. To provide an example: a positive figure, such as 0.5, means that a country’s net lending as share on 
GDP is higher than Germany’s by 0.5 percentage points.  
11 Some authors use data on bid-ask spreads to proxy for the liquidity risk, but such data were not available to us. 
12 We wanted to follow previous research using the US corporate bond yields instead of the bank prime loan rate, 
but such data was not available to us. 11 
 
We also used dummy variable South for southern EMU states
13 and dummy variable 
HighDebt for those EMU states whose gross public debt in the period under investigation was 
higher than 60% of their GDP on average.
14  
During our estimation we tried to include into the regression the squared terms of NetLending 
and GrossDebt and different interactions of the explanatory variables .
15  
We also looked at the statistical properties of the key variables. We tested Spread, NetLending 
and GrossDebt for stationarity. We examined these time series using the Fisher-ADF panel 
unit root test. While for NetLending and GrossDebt we rejected the null hypothesis of unit 
root, in the case of Spread we could not reject this null hypothesis. The results are shown in 
the Appendix, Table A1. Looking back to Figure 2 where we can see a clear rise in the 
spreads, this is not surprising. However, we suppose that such result of the test is mainly due 
to the possible presence of a structural break in the data connected with the latest financial 
and economic crisis.  
We therefore estimate an OLS model, checking whether the inclusion of the country-specific 
fixed effects is appropriate. 
3.2 The governments’ reaction 
To investigate the issue of the governments’ reaction to the financial markets we used annual 
data from 1999 to 2009 for 16 EMU countries. We could not use quarterly data because the 
variable that we decided to use as dependent variable is only available on an annual basis.  
Data on government bond yield spreads were taken from the IMF (International Financial 
Statistics) and all other variables were taken from the AMECO database of the European 
Commission.  
Based on Balassone et al. (2004) we estimate a regression showing how governments adjust 
their fiscal policies in reaction to rising spreads. However, we also try to capture the effect of 
the latest crisis on the governments’ behaviour.  
Our regression is the following:  
 
Our dependent variable which should capture the fiscal behaviour of governments is StrPrBal 
(the structural primary balance, defined by Eurostat as net lending excluding interest, 
cyclically adjusted based on trend GDP, expressed as share on GDP in percent. We use 
cyclically adjusted figures because these should reflect governments’ fiscal behaviour better 
                                                            
13 Namely Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain. 
14 Namely Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Malta.  
15 E.g. the interaction of crisis (or turmoil) and different fiscal or liquidity indicators; the interaction of country 
dummies and different fiscal or liquidity indicators; the interaction of crisis and country dummies and different 
fiscal or liquidity indicators; the interaction of proxies for international risk aversion and different fiscal 
indicators.  12 
 
than not adjusted figures, as the governments clearly cannot influence the economic cycle (or 
events such as the latest crisis which caused a great economic slowdown in most countries). 
The development of this variable in the period under investigation is shown in Figure 3.  
Our key explanatory variable is Spread, i.e. the difference between a country’s long-term 
government bond yield and the German long-term government bond yield which is expressed 
in percentage points and which shows how the markets value the given country’s government 
bonds. We expect that as Spread increases, the government starts reducing its borrowing to 
make the markets decrease the yields and thus lower its costs of borrowing.  
As other factors that are likely to have an impact on a country’s structural primary balance we 
use the lagged value of the dependent variable because the speed at which governments can 
increase revenues or decrease expenses is rather limited and thus the structural primary 
balance usually does not change very quickly; the gross public debt as share on GDP 
(GrossDebt) that is expected to have a positive effect on the dependent variable (we assume 
that a higher stock of debt induces the government to start pursuing more responsible fiscal 
policies) and the current account as share on GDP (CA) that is expected to have a negative 
effect on the dependent variable (we expect that lower current account balance will make the 
government decrease its net lending). All these variables are expressed in percent.  
We again include into the estimation the dummy variable HighDebt in interaction with other 
explanatory variables to see whether high debt countries are adjusting their fiscal policies in a 
different way than countries with low public debts.   
Figure 3 – Structural primary balance of EMU countries in 1999 – 2010 (in % of GDP) 
 
Source: IMF, International financial statistics.  
 
We use several time dummy variables that theoretically should be the same as in the previous 
estimation where quarterly data were used. However, as this time we use annual data, we need 
to simplify these variables: turmoil thus has the value of 1 in 2007 and 0 otherwise; crisis has 13 
 
the value of 1 in  2008 and 2009 and 0 otherwise; and turmcris has the value of 1 from 2007 
on and 0 otherwise. In our estimation we try to include different interactions of the 
explanatory variables. 
We also looked at the statistical properties of our key variables. We tested StrPrBal, Spread 
and GrossDebt for stationarity. We examined these time series using the Fisher-ADF panel 
unit root test. While for StrPrBal we rejected the null hypothesis of unit root, in the case of 
Spread and GrossDebt we could not reject this null hypothesis. The results are shown in the 
Appendix, Table A2. However, as we work with very short time series, we have to bear in 
mind that we cannot draw strong conclusions from the tests, also given that the end of our 
sample is strongly influenced by the crisis.  
As we use the lagged value of the dependent variable as one of the explanatory variables 
which could give rise to autocorrelation, we apply the Arellano-Bond estimator (a dynamic 
panel data estimation technique, taking a partial adjustment based approach).
16 This is also 




Table 1 presents our estimation results. In all the models the coefficients have the expected 
signs.  
We begin our estimation by the inclusion of NetLending and GrossDebt only in Model 1. We 
can see that the effect of both these variables on Spread is relatively high. However, the 
coefficient on NetLending diminishes by one half when we include also the turmoil and crisis 
dummies which can be seen in Model 2.
17 By doing this we try to estimate how the spreads 
were affected by the recent crisis. When we add also other variables, mainly interactions of 
different variables with the crisis dummy, the coefficient on NetLending gets even closer to 0. 
This suggests that in normal times the markets do not price the government bonds based on 
the states’ deficits.  
GrossDebt has a positive effect on Spread: when a country’s gross debt increases by 1 
percentage point relative to Germany, the spread of this government’s bond yields relative to 
Germany increases by 0.009 - 0.01 percentage point, depending on the model. According to 
our estimation, the turmoil period had a significant effect on the spreads of government bond 
yields relative to Germany: in this period, spreads increased by 0.07 – 0.14 percentage points, 
depending on the model. Nevertheless, the effect of the crisis was even stronger: it caused an 
increase in spreads by at least 0.7 percentage points.  
                                                            
16 For more details on this method see Arellano & Bond (1991).  
17 The inclusion of these two dummy variables proved to be better than the inclusion of only one of them or the 
inclusion of turmcris.   14 
 
Table 1 – Estimation results 1 
Dependent variable: 
Spread  Model 1     Model 2    Model 3    Model 4     Model 5   
Const 0.3626 *** 0.2372 *** 0.2197 *** 0.0614  *  0.1956 ***
NetLending -0.0285 *** -0.0102 **  -0.0045 *** -0.0029      -0.0036 ** 
GrossDebt 0.0109 *  0.0129 *** 0.0102 *** 0.0088  ***  0.0106 ***
Turmoil       0.1373 *** 0.1365 *** 0.0668  *  0.1263 ***
Crisis       0.7561 *** 0.7188 *** 0.7896  ***  0.7431 ***
Crisis*NetLending           -0.0329 *** -0.0349  ***  -0.0334 ***
Crisis*DebtShare           -0.0205 *** -0.0225  ***  -0.0205 ***
Crisis*GDPgrowth           -0.0178 *** -0.0171  ***  -0.0175 ***
South*crisis*GrossDebt           0.0129 *** 0.0134  ***  0.0129 ***
SR_IntRate                  0.0471  ***      
US_Spread                          0.0153 ***
                            
Adjusted R2  0.4246    0.7828    0.8526    0.8651     0.8548   
Akaike criterion  207.09    -239.05   -413.64    -453.36     -419.76   
DW statistic  0.6876   0.9516   1.1996  1.3465   1.2187  
Test statistic for common 
intercept 6.9252 *** 19.4176 *** 20.3802 *** 20.1988  ***  21.1285 ***
Test statistic for 
normality of residuals  229.55 *** 229.36 *** 278.06 *** 343.85  ***  265.68 ***
Number of observations  460    460    460    460     460   
Note:     1) ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively 
  2) standard errors are HAC robust  
 
During the crisis, the importance of the height of the budget deficit increased significantly: an 
increase in NetLending by 1 percentage point resulted in a 0.03 percentage point decrease in 
Spread. Other two factors have also become important during the crisis: DebtShare, proxying 
for the liquidity premium, and GDPgrowth. In the time of crisis, the markets valued better 
bonds of countries with higher GDP growth (with a 1 percentage point increase in 
GDPgrowth, Spread decreased by nearly 0.02 percentage points) and also of those countries 
whose debt had a higher share on the whole euro-area debt (with a 1 percentage point increase 
in  DebtShare,  Spread decreased by 0.02 percentage points). This would suggest that the 
largest Eurozone economies, such as Germany or France, were perceived as relatively safer 
borrowers.  
In the time of crisis the importance of GrossDebt increased especially for southern EMU 
members. For these a 1 percentage point increase in the gross debt relative to Germany meant 
an additional 0.01 percentage point increase in the bond yield spread. It thus seems that during 
the crisis the financial markets started to be sensitive to many more factors than in the 
previous times.  
Based on previous research papers we also tried to proxy for international risk aversion. In 
Model 4 we used the short-term interest rate (SR_IntRate) and in Model 5 we used 15 
 
US_Spread. Mostly the inclusion of these variables did not change much the coefficients of 
the other explanatory variables. This holds especially for Model 5 where the fit of the model 
increased only slightly. Nevertheless, in Model 4 the fit increased significantly, the biggest 
change in coefficients or their significance appearing in the case of NetLending and turmoil. It 
thus seems that the inclusion of the proxies for international risk aversion is relevant. An 
interesting finding is that in Model 4 the significance of turmoil has decreased with the 
inclusion of the proxy for international risk aversion. This would suggest that these two 
variables are somehow interconnected. The same cannot, however, be said about variable 
crisis.  
Many variables that we expected to be important were not significant in our estimations. 
These were first, the squared terms of NetLending and GrossDebt. Second, the current 
account, CA, and the share of interest payable on the revenues, Int/Rev. These two variables 
were not significant even in interaction with crisis or South dummies. Third, variables such as 
DebtShare and GDPgrowth were not significant when included by themselves, but in 
interaction with the crisis dummy they turned out to be significant. Fourth, variable 
GrossDebt was not significant in interaction with crisis, but when these two were interacted 
also with the dummy variable South, the term was significant. Fifth, when we included 
interactions of different fiscal indicators with proxies for international risk aversion, these 
terms did not turn out to be significant.  
Finally, the dummy variable HighDebt was not significant, neither in interaction with fiscal 
indicators, nor with fiscal indicators and the crisis dummy, which would suggest that the 
markets did not perceive high-debt countries disproportionately differently from the low-debt 
countries. However, this would probably be different if we could have included data for year 
2010 as spreads of many high-debt countries (such as Greece, Portugal) have risen 
significantly.  
For all the models we have checked that neither pooled OLS, nor a random-effects model 
would be more adequate than the fixed-effects model: the test statistic for common intercept 
is highly significant in all cases (see Table 1) and according to the Hausman test GLS 
estimators would not be consistent.  
Comparing our results with the previous research we note that our coefficients are mostly 
lower. Taking e.g. Schuknecht et al. (2010), we can see that our coefficients both on 
NetLending and GrossDebt are significantly lower and the same holds for the interaction of 
these variables with the crisis dummy. We attribute this especially to the fact that we have 
included the turmoil and crisis dummy variables also separately into the regression, not only 
in interaction with other variables. It thus seems that due to this we estimated the reaction of 
the markets to fiscal developments both before and during the crisis to be significantly lower 
than in the above mentioned paper, which would weaken the conclusions of its authors.  16 
 
As we can see in Table 1, in none of the models the residuals have a normal distribution. We 
show in Figure A3 in the Appendix that their main problem is probably too high kurtosis for 
having a normal distribution.  
Our estimation suggests that financial markets do change their pricing of a government’s 
bonds when its fiscal stance deteriorates. While before the start of the crisis government bond 
spreads basically responded to the level of gross public debt only (the budget deficits affected 
the spreads only very slightly or not at all), when the crisis began the importance of the 
budget deficits increased. Furthermore, southern states started to be penalized by the markets 
for the size of their public debt more than other Eurozone countries. This is very likely due to 
the fact that these states are often perceived as having relatively worse fundamentals.  
4.2 The governments’ reaction  
Table 2 presents our estimation results. Of the four models, Model 2 seems to be the most 
appropriate: it has the best statistical properties as at the 5% level of significance it is not 
over-identified and the errors are not AR(2). All coefficients have the expected sign. 
However, GrossDebt is not significant in any of the models.  
Table 2 – Estimation results 2  
dependent variable: StrPrBal  Model 1    Model 2     Model 3     Model 4    
Const -0.550 ***  -0.558 **  -0.516 **  -0.590 ** 
StrPrBal(-1)  0.512 *** 0.446 *** 0.489 *** 0.444 *** 
Spread(-1)  0.522 *  1.179 ***        0.679   
GrossDebt(-1)  0.002   0.001    0.004    0.003   
crisis -0.721 ***  -0.726 *  -0.996 *** 
crisis*Spread(-1)            1.462 **  1.092   
Safedef*Spread(-1)                       
                        
SSR  369.08 350.57    360.99    346.66   
Test for AR(1) errors  -1.97 ** -1.86 *  -2.14 **  -2.00 ** 
Test for AR(2) errors  -0.81 -0.86    -0.74    -0.79   
Sargan over-identification test  49.83 49.71    48.96    52.41 * 
Wald (joint) test  48.51 *** 98.50 ***  100.54 ***  123.65 *** 
Test for normality of residuals  2.59 3.29   3.04    2.65  
Number of observations  112 112   112    112  
Note: ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively 
 
We can see that StrPrBal is strongly influenced by its past value. Furthermore, in Model 1 we 
can see that with a 1 percentage point increase in Spread,  StrPrBal increases by 0.5 
percentage points but only at the 10% level of significance. This would suggest that the 
structural primary balance is strongly influenced by its height in the previous period but that it 
is independent of the financial markets’ signals.  17 
 
In all the other models we also take into account the effect of the crisis: variable crisis has a 
significant negative effect on the dependent variable. This event caused a decrease in the 
structural primary balance relative to GDP by 0.7 – 1 percentage points. Model 2 suggests that 
governments react to the bond yield spreads even at the 1% level of significance: with a 1 
percentage point increase in Spread, StrPrBal increases by 1.2 percentage points relative to 
GDP in the following period.  
We included into Model 3 the interaction of crisis and Spread instead of Spread only. The 
effect of this term was greater than the effect of only Spread itself: during the crisis a 1 
percentage point increase in Spread made the governments improve the structural primary 
budget balance by 1.5 percentage points relative to GDP in the following period. The 
coefficient was, however, slightly less significant. When in Model 4 both Spread  and 
crisis*Spread were included in the estimation, they both turned out to be insignificant while 
the coefficient of crisis decreased to nearly -1.  
However, when we tested the hypothesis that the coefficient on Spread was the same before 
and during the crisis, i.e. that coeff(Spread_1)=1.462 and coeff(crisis*Spread_1)=1.179, in 
neither of the two cases we could reject the null hypothesis that the reaction of governments 
to increasing costs of borrowing did not change after the start of the crisis. The result of this 
test is reported in the Appendix, Table A3.  
When we included into our estimation an interaction of HighDebt and Spread, and also 
HighDebt and GrossDebt, they both turned out to be insignificant.  
Comparing our estimation results with Balassone et al. (2004) for the period 1999 – 2003 in 
their paper, we note the following: in our Model 1, which is the closest one to theirs, the 
estimate of the effect of the past value of the dependent variable is slightly higher in our 
estimation (0.51 compared to 0.45) and the effect of Spread is slightly lower (0.52 compared 
to 0.67). Unlike Balassone et al. (2004) our effect of GrossDebt is not significant.  
However, when we take into account the effect of the crisis, the impact on the past value of 
the dependent variable is very similar to theirs (also 0.45) and the effect of Spread very 
significantly increases (the coefficient rises to 1.18 compared to 0.67 in their estimation). 
As we only did our estimation for the period of time when the EMU was already in place, it is 
impossible for us to distinguish whether the governments improved the structural primary 
balance in response to the financial markets' signals or whether they did so because according 
to the SGP their deficits must not exceed 3% of GDP.  
In this respect we may base our conclusions on the results of Balassone et al. (2004) who did 
their estimation for several time periods and in each of them they obtained different results: in 
the period 1992 – 1998 (which can be considered a time of a run up to EMU), the reaction of 
the structural primary balance to the spreads was significantly lower than for the period 1999 
– 2003 when the SGP was already in place (0.16 compared to 0.67). This difference was even 
more significant for the period 1981 – 1991 (the coefficient on the spread was only 0.05) 18 
 
when EU countries were not bound by any supra-national fiscal rule and the introduction of 
such rule was not even planned. 
Our estimation suggests that governments do react to increasing costs of borrowing (or 
spreads). However, given that spreads were mostly quite low after the inception of the EMU 
(in terms of tenths of percentage points, or tens of basis points, before the start of the crisis as 
we could see in Figure 2), an increase by 0.5 percentage points is already very big – such a 
thing happened e.g. to Greece between 2007 and 2008 (during this time its budget deficit 
increased from below 4% to 7.8%  of GDP, i.e. it nearly doubled) or to Italy between 2008 
and 2009 (during this time its budget deficit increased from below 2.7% to 5.2%  of GDP) – 
and this would only trigger, according to Models 2 and 5, a 0.5 - 0.6 percentage point 
improvement in the structural primary balance in the following period. Given that such big 
increase in spreads only happened when budget deficits increased a lot, such governments’ 
reaction may simply not be sufficient to maintain fiscal discipline.  
Therefore it seems that even if the SGP very likely contributed to a more responsible fiscal 
behaviour of the governments, it was not powerful enough and did not keep Eurozone 
countries from having excessive deficits. This can be documented by the fact that most 
countries whose spreads increased significantly in 2008 often corrected their deficits only 
slightly in 2009 and continued breaching the Pact.  
 
5  Conclusion 
The aim of this paper is to answer the question whether in the case of a monetary union the 
financial markets have a sufficiently disciplining effect on the governments’ fiscal behaviour 
and whether thus fiscal rules are redundant. To do this we needed to investigate three issues: 
the institutional setup and market conditions in the EMU, the reaction of the markets to 
changing fiscal stances of governments and the reaction of governments to a change in the 
markets’ pricing of their bonds.  
Our results suggest that the markets do react to fiscal indicators but that this reaction was 
much weaker before the start of the latest financial and economic crisis than at the end of 
2008 and in 2009. Before the crisis, government bond spreads reacted mainly to the gross 
public debt. However, the crisis has brought, apart an overall increase in the level of spreads, 
a reaction of the financial markets to budget deficits and, in the case of southern EMU states, 
an even stronger reaction to the height of the gross public debt. We expect that if 2010 data 
were included to the estimation, both these effects would probably become even stronger.  
Concerning the governments’ reaction to the change in financial markets’ pricing of their 
bonds, our results suggest that the governments do react to increasing spreads of their bond 
yields relative to Germany by improving their structural primary budget balance but that the 
reaction is not very strong and we assume that before the introduction of the EMU it was even 19 
 
weaker. Also, we have found that this reaction was not affected significantly by the latest 
crisis.  
Our conclusion could thus be that the financial markets could potentially have a disciplining 
effect on the governments. This is, however, spoiled by the rather weak reaction of the 
governments to changing market conditions. Furthermore, reminding the importance of the 
institutional setup and market conditions in the EMU, we have to note that there are many 
obstacles to the effectiveness of this setting. First, official data on government finance are 
released with a significant delay. Second, although bail-out is prohibited by the Treaty, these 
days we may suppose that the reaction both of the financial markets and of the governments is 
biased because of the behaviour of the EMU towards its members that got in financial 
troubles: the loans granted to Greece and Ireland are considered by many to be very close to a 
bail-out.  
We are aware of the fact that the Stability and Growth Pact has not been powerful enough to 
keep the states fiscally disciplined even before the crisis, but we suppose that without this set 
of fiscal rules the member states’ situation would probably be even worse. Given all the 
problems mentioned above our conclusion therefore is that the Stability and Growth Pact 
cannot be effectively substituted by the financial markets and the EMU thus needs to have 




Figure A1 – Government bond yields of EMU countries from 1999 to 2009 (in %)  
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Figure A3 – Test for normality of residuals 
Model  1     Model  2 
 
 
















Table A1 – Panel integration and cointegration tests 
 Integration test 
 NetLending  GrossDebt  Spread 
ADF – Fisher chi-square  46.6**  52.3***  32.5 
Notes:   1) ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively. 
2) for all tests the number of lags was chosen automatically using the Hannan-Quinn information   
        criterion and individual intercepts were included in the test equation.  
3) We assumed individual unit root processes. 
 
 
Table A2 - Panel integration test 
Integration test 
 StrPrBal  Spread  GrossDebt 
ADF – Fisher chi-square  40.8**  20.2  18.3 
Notes:   1) ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively. 
2) for the test the number of lags was chosen automatically using the Hannan-Quinn information   
        criterion and individual intercepts were included in the test equation.  
3) We assumed individual unit root processes. 
 
 
Table A3 – Hypothesis testing 
Null hypothesis  Test statistic P-value 
 coeff[spread_1] = 1.462  1.57304 0.2098
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